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Introduction
As the Chinese economy becomes increasingly innovation-driven, research and development (R&D) expenditures and patent applications have significantly increased. China's ratio of gross expenditures for R&D to GDP has overtaken that of the European Union, and in gross R&D expenditure China is projected to overtake the USA around 2020 (OECD 2014) . China is already leading in patent applications (World Bank 2016) and ranks second in applications made under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) (WIPO 2018) . In recent years, China's patent applications have risen disproportionately against its R&D expenditures, resulting in decreasing R&D inputs per patent.
The Chinese government uses patent targets, subsidies, and other policy instruments to incentivize applications. The National Patent Development Strategy (2011-2020) targets 75 thousand PCT patent applications in 2020, which would make China the leading PCT applicant country (WIPO 2018) . It is well documented that patent subsidies are a driver of patent quantity in China (Chen and Zhang 2019 , Dang and Motohashi 2015 , Li 2012 , and also support international and PCT applications. Additionally, there are other policy instruments, such as tax allowances, that increase the expected value of patenting for the applicant and may thereby incentivize more applications.
Typically, patent applications are determined by R&D inputs and the expectation that the economic value of a patent exceeds its cost (Griliches 1990) . Following the theoretical argument that a cost reduction, e.g. through subsidies, disproportionately incentivizes patents of marginal value (de Rassenfosse and Jaffee 2018), the increase in China's patent quantity may have happened to the detriment of patent quality.
The empirical assessment of China's patent quality is challenging. One issue is that China's patent office does not publicly disclose citation data that is widely used to measure patent quality (Harhoff et al. 1999) . Moreover, even if citations were observable, further problems arise. Citation inflation through an increase in subsidy-induced, low quality patent applications may introduce an upward bias on this quality measure. To perform a comprehensive analysis of China's patent quality we validate domestic citations in comparison to foreign ones, which are invariant to China's economic policy, as economic indicators. International comparability of citation data is ensured by restricting the analysis to citations generated by international search reports (ISRs) in the PCT system.
We extend the original ISR index , which is based on foreign citations, by adding domestic and self citations. Whereas the use of foreign citations shows that Chinese PCT patent applications reach only a third of the non-Chinese quality benchmark, the extension towards domestic and self citations suggests a higher quality level that converges to or even surpasses the international benchmark. We investigate these differences based on firm-level regressions and find that in China, only foreign citations, but not domestic and self citations, are a valid indicator of patent quality. Using Germany as a representative country without patent subsidies, we show that all three citations types may be used as economic indicators if policy distortion is not a concern. In conclusion, our results show that in China, domestic and self citations suffer from an upward bias and should be employed with caution if they are to be interpreted as a measure of patent quality. Our findings also support the argument by Goodhart (1975) and Lucas (1976) that indicators fail as reliable measures if they become the target of policy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we explain relevant details of the PCT system. In section 3 we discuss the properties of citation types and extend the ISR indices. In section 4 we describe our data and define our variables. In section 5 we show the descriptive analysis of patent quality and the present the validation of our indices. In section 6 we discuss our results and the wider applicability of the indices. Finally, section 7 concludes.
The PCT system
The PCT system offers applicants international protection of inventions in up to 148 countries (WIPO 2015a). It is increasingly used by applicants worldwide, amassing a total of about 214,500 PCT filings in 2014 (WIPO 2015a). As applicants choose only more valuable inventions for protection in numerous foreign countries, PCT applications are more homogeneous than a mixture of national and international applications.
Applications are filed with a competent Receiving Office (RO), which is determined according to the home country of the applicant. For example, Chinese applicants must file PCT applications with the Chinese Patent Office (SIPO) as the RO. SIPO is also the only competent office to act as an International Search Authority (ISA). The designated ISAs publish the international search report (ISR) 18 months after the priority date. Globally, the search for prior art is highly concentrated: the top five ISAs were responsible for more than 95% of ISRs in 2014 (European Patent Office (EPO) 38.8%, Japanese Patent Office (JPO) 20.0%, Korean Patent Office (KPO) 14.9%, SIPO 13.5%, USPTO 10.6% (WIPO 2015a, p. 74f.)). 1 ISRs contain references to prior art. In the PCT system, applicants are encouraged to provide references to prior art. The description of the application should "indicate the background art which, as far as known to the applicant, can be regarded as useful for the understanding, searching and examination of the invention, and, preferably, cite the documents reflecting such art" (Rule 5 of WIPO 2016b). 2 However, in the PCT system it is ultimately the examiner who determines which references are included in the ISR. Such selected references are an appropriate measure of patent quality as they constitute an evaluation by a third partynamely by the examinerof the technical and legal relationships among patents. Furthermore, examiner citations show a much stronger correlation with patent value than applicant citations (Hegde and Sampat 2009) .
It is important to note that even though national patent offices act as ISAs, the examiners of the different offices follow the same strict examination rules from WIPO when drafting an ISR (WIPO 2016a). As we exclusively consider ISR citations, we rule out heterogeneity in national examination procedures and assure the comparability of citations. 3
The search guidelines explain in detail how citations are to be selected by the examiners (WIPO 2016a, §15.67-15.72) . Examiners are encouraged to cite only the most relevant documents and, in the case that several members of one patent family are available, to cite documents in the language of the application (WIPO 2016a, §15.69). Due to the strict search rules defined by WIPO, the citation-bias of patent examiners against foreign prior art is adequately addressed.
Against this regulatory background, Michel and Bettels (2001) report insights from actual examination practices and discuss the comparability of ISR citations for statistical 1 Note that applicants from the USA can file applications with numerous other offices than USPTO, e.g. EPO, JPO, and KPO. Thus, the number of searches for prior art at the respective ISAs is not directly indicative of the respective country's level of PCT applications. 2 The PCT rules strike a balance between the regulations of the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and the European Patent Office (EPO). Whereas the USPTO requires applicants to provide references to all relevant prior art that they are aware of, the EPO requires only that examiners, and not applicants, carry out this task (Michel and Bettels 2001) . 3 The international phase ends 30 months after the priority date and applications enter the national phase in which national patent offices perform additional search and examination before making the grant decision. Citations in the national phase may differ from ISR citations as the former follow national guidelines. In order to restrict the citations to one institutional setting, we do not consider citations generated during the national phase for our quality indices. analysis. They point out that the USPTO's mean number of citations generated per domestic application is three times larger than the corresponding mean at the EPO. However, when these offices function as ISAs, the difference largely disappears and the authors recommend ISR citations generated within the PCT system for the purpose of cross-country comparisons.
While one cannot rule out idiosyncratic deviations from WIPO's regulations by individual examiners, there seems to be no indication of systematic deviation by individual ISAs. Having provided regulatory and empirical arguments favoring ISR citations generated via the PCT system for cross-country comparison, we next define how these citations are employed in ISR indices.
Index definition
The patent system provides several measures that have been used as quality indicators for patents. Among others, the number of references (backward citations), the existence of international applications, and the incidence of opposition filings have been used (Harhoff et al. 2003) . It is generally accepted in the literature that forward citations provide the best approximation of patent quality (Jaffe and de Rassenfosse 2017, Gambardella et al. 2008 , Reitzig 2004 . That is, forward citations are a reflection of the technical value (Trajtenberg 1990 ) and the economic value (Harhoff et al. 1999 ) of inventions.
Using citations as an indicator of quality has shortcomings as the average citation counts vary by technology and by the priority year of the patent. The literature has advanced towards using normalized citation counts as suggested by Hall et al. (2001) . The number of citations received by a given patent is divided by the average citation count of patents from the same technology and the same priority year. Thus, citation counts are made comparable. A limitation of this approach is that it is no longer possible to investigate how patent quality evolves over time. By construction, the average patent quality for each technology-priority cohort is equal to one.
In a further step introduce the ISR index as a quality measure that extends current best practice of using normalized citations in three respects.
First, they choose a benchmark for normalization that does not rely upon the patents to be analyzed. For example, if the analysis group is patents from a specific country, then the normalization benchmark can be set by the average citations of patents from all other countries, excluding the country of interest. The index allows the flexibility to choose a comparison group that is a good fit for the intended analysis. Because patent quality is measured relative to a comparison group, it is possible to measure quality changes over time.
The index takes on a value of 100% if the quality level of the analysis group equals the quality level of the comparison group. Secondly, the index only uses citations generated by international search reports (ISRs) of PCT applications to achieve international comparability.
Finally, the index is based only on citations produced by PCT applications from foreign countries (F citations), i.e. excluding PCT applications from the analysis group. This restriction ensures that citations are independent of the economic policy of the country whose patents are in the analysis group.
We extend the quality index from by considering domestic citations (D citations), i.e. citations from patents of the country of the applicant, and self citations (S citations), i.e. citations from earlier patents of the applicant itself. Whereas invariance with respect to national policy can be an advantage of a quality index, the inclusion of domestic and self citations may provide a more comprehensive and better understanding of patent quality. In the following discussion, we lay out specific characteristics of foreign, domestic, and self citations and define the extended ISR quality indices.
Generally, foreign citations are understood as a measure of high quality because they indicate the international competitiveness of domestic inventions. Firms build on prior art from third countries given that the cited inventions are closer to the global technology frontier than inventions from their own country. In addition, a high share of foreign citations on domestic science shows that foreign firms seek to appropriate the results of domestic R&D (Tijssen 2001) .
In contrast to international competitiveness proxied by foreign citations, domestic citations are rather a measure of an economy's technological self-reliance. Stronger reliance on domestic prior art may correspond to a higher level of development as there is less dependence on research conducted abroad. For example, Kang et al. (2014) study the Chinese and Korean telecommunication industry and find that, over time, firms increasingly cite prior art from their own country for standard-essential patents. As the diffusion of knowledge correlates negatively with geographical distance, it is useful to distinguish foreign and domestic citations because domestic citations are received earlier (Narin 1994 , Jaffe et al. 1993 , Jaffe and Trajtenberg 1999 .
While foreign and domestic citations differ across international and national provenance of follow-up inventions, self citations examine follow-up inventions within organizations. Empirical studies tend to find that self citations are more valuable to firms than non-self citations (e.g., Hall et al. 2005 , Deng 2008 . Firms with more self citations are able to appropriate returns from earlier investment in R&D and signal the presence of "cumulative innovations" (Lanjouw and Schankerman 2004) . Self citations may also be an indicator of "fencing"which is prevalent when firms build an "IPR wall" around themselves (Belderbos and Somers 2015) . Because foreign, domestic, and self citations characterize different origins of follow-up inventions, a more nuanced understanding of patent quality can be achieved by considering information from all three citation types.
Calculation of ISR indices
In the remainder of this section we define the extended ISR indices based on foreign, domestic, and self citations. To correctly apply the index, one must define two sets of patents: the analysis group and the comparison group. For example, if the quality of PCT applications of a specific country is to be analyzed, it is natural to choose the PCT applications from all other countries as comparison group. In this situation the indices reflect the relative positioning of the analysis country to the rest of the world.
The ISR indices are first calculated at the year-technology level. The information content of the indices increases monotonically by index type, first relying only on F citations, then also including D and S citations. The ISR index is defined at the level of year t and technology k as follows:
Nt,k is the number of patents in the analysis group. Mt,k is the number of patents in the comparison group. ISR citationsi is the number of ISR citations received by patent i within the specified time window, e.g. 3 or 5 years.
In order to obtain the quality indices at the desired level of aggregation (e.g. country-, industry-, or firm-level), one has to multiply the year and technology specific indices with the number of applications per year and technology (Nt,k), sum over the products, and then divide by the number of patents in the aggregate (N). 4 Index values of above (below) 100% correspond to average patent quality above (below) the quality level of the comparison group.
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We define three distinct ISR indices for patent quality. The F index is the original index as established by . It only considers non-self citations received by foreign countries, i.e. from countries other than the applicant country (F citations). The quality measurement of this index is exogenous with respect to domestic economic policy. In addition to F citations, the extended FD index also accounts for non-self citations of domestic origin (D citations). The measurement of this index is exogenous with respect to the patenting strategy of the applicant. The FDS index is the most comprehensive index as it also takes self citations (S citations) into account. There is a tradeoff between relying on more "neutral" sources of information and being more inclusive.
Variable definition and data

Index definition for China
In our application of the index we choose PCT applications from China as analysis group and non-Chinese PCT applications as comparison group. Our indices provide information on whether the strong increase in China's patent quantity influenced the average patent quality.
The comparison of Chinese PCT applications to the non-Chinese benchmark allows for an assessment of the average quality of Chinese PCT applications relative to the rest of the world. We choose a time period of 3 years as our citation window, and we define technologies at the 3-digit level of the IPC classification.
Data sources
Beginning with China's patent expansion in 2001, we observe all PCT applications with priority years between 2001 and 2009 using the EPO Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT Version April 2013). During the priority year, the applicant can file applications for the same invention at additional patent offices. Applications are allocated to countries according to the address of the first applicant. We only consider citations from distinct pairs of citing and cited patent families and identify self citations based on DOCDB standard names from PATSTAT and the EEE-PPAT applicant name harmonization (Magerman et al. 2006) .
To categorize patents according to technology, we use the 3-digit technology class level of the IPC classification and apply fractional counting to apportion patents that belong to more than one technology class. Given the typical trade-off between precision and timeliness characteristic of work with patent citations, we restrict the citation window to a still informative three years to capture more recent dynamics.
To validate ISR indices, we calculate these indices at the firm level and evaluate them against firm characteristics. Our Chinese firm-level data consists of all firms listed at the stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen between 2001 and 2009. 5 Due to government stock issuance quotas, the sample mainly includes domestic large-and medium-sized firms from manufacturing industries and the coastal region, whereas other industries and inland regions are represented to a lesser extent. 6 The balance sheet information is compiled from DATASTREAM and the Chinese databases CSMAR, RESSET, and WIND. As the coverage of R&D expenditures in these databases is rather incomplete before 2007, supplementary information on reported R&D expenditures has been collected from the universe of annual reports accessible via the Chinese CNINFO database.
In addition to R&D information, we also observe a firm's number of employees, age, ownership, industry affiliation, and the provincial GDP per capita. All variables in monetary values have been deflated using China's GDP deflator from the World Bank. Finally, we merge patent data with the firm panel data following the procedure detailed in . Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for firm-year observations with above zero PCT applications. We calculate the average index over all PCT applications filed by a firm in a given year. The F index, FD index, and FDS index have a mean of 43.3%, 76.4%, and 87.5%, respectively. Employing the perpetual investment method, we follow the standard in the literature and compute the R&D stock assuming a 5% annual growth rate of R&D and an annual depreciation rate of 15% (Hall et al. 2010 ). The R&D stock has a mean of 488 million RMB and a median of 30.4 million RMB. 7 The PCT intensity is calculated as the application stock depreciated by an annual rate of 15% and scaled by thousand employees. This variable proxies the accumulated experience in international patenting. PCT applicants are relatively large and rather young: the median of employees is 3126 and the median age is 11 years. To reflect China's economic reforms, we broadly differentiate between firms with and without state ownership and find that, according to this distinction, 41.7% of observations are from private firms. We account for regional heterogeneity in China's economic development by GDP per capita at the provincial level. Table A1 in the appendix shows pairwise correlations of the variables. 
Descriptive statistics
Empirical analysis
The Chinese government relies on patent targets and policy instruments to incentivize applications. In 2020, the National Patent Development Strategy (2011-2020) targets 75 thousand PCT patents applications, which would make China the world leading country in PCT applications. It is well documented that patent subsidies have contributed to the increase in patent quantity (Chen and Zhang 2019 , Dang and Motohashi 2015 , Li 2012 , and there are also subsidies to support international and PCT applications. 8 In addition, other policy instruments, such as tax allowances, may indirectly change the cost or value of patenting and thereby contribute to more applications. 9 Goodhart (1975) and Lucas (1976) point out that indicators may fail as reliable measures if they become the target of policy. Along these lines it is meaningful that patent applications have risen faster than R&D expenditures in recent years ( Figure A1 ), resulting in decreasing R&D inputs per patent ( Figure A2 ).
Our concern is that China may experience a "citation inflation" (Marco 2007) . Given that a patent is applied for if the expected value exceeds the cost of patenting, a cost reduction, e.g. through subsidies, disproportionately incentivizes marginal, low-quality patents (Griliches 1990 , de Rassenfosse and Jaffee 2018). Hence, China's policy not only increases the quantity of patents but simultaneously incentivizes applications of lower quality. 
Descriptive analysis of patent quality
The differences between the F, FD, and FDS indices are striking ( Note: Mean values for F index, FD index, and FDS index displayed as percentages. The first column is a replication from . Observations are at the patent level.
The variation of indices across six technology areas is displayed in Figure A3 . Patents in the field of electrical engineering, which constitute the majority with 57% of China's PCT applications, also exhibit the largest difference between the F index (27.5%) and the FDS index (97.6%). The dominance of electrical engineering is related to ZTE and Huawei, two globally operating ICT firms that together file one third of Chinese PCT applications.
Additional analysis shows that both firms receive fewer foreign citations than the average Chinese applicant but, consistent with their large size, exhibit considerably more self citations. Applications in the second largest field, chemistry, display the smallest difference between the F index (38.4%) and the FDS index (49.3%). This variation is in consistent with the typical citation behavior in complex vs. discrete technologies. The differences in the remaining technology areasmechanical engineering, consumer goods and construction, instruments, and process engineeringfall somewhere in the middle.
Because variation in the indices is not only determined by Chinese patents, but also by the non-Chinese comparison group, we investigate average citations for both groups separately in Table 3 . We find that the decline of the 12 Quantifying the effect of language bias, show that China's average ISR index based on F citations increases only modestly from 32.1% to 35.6% after taking the bias into account. As core elements of PCT applications are published in Englishi.e. abstract, title, search report, and text of drawingsnegative bias that results from Chinese-only language elements is negligible. low quality patents, or whether they adequately reflect China's rising innovation capacity. In the following subsection we therefore validate different citation types as indicators of patent quality.
Index validation
Following the simple model by Griliches (1990) , a patent application is stochastically determined by the amount of R&D devoted to the respective research project and the expectation that the economic value of patenting exceeds the cost of patenting. Given that the patent premium remains stable and that the level of current and past R&D expenditures, i.e. the R&D stock, increases the technological success of research projects, an increase in the number of patents is understood as an increase in economically valuable knowledge. The production of knowledge ̇ depends on R&D (̇= + ), and the patent count depends on ̇ ( =̇+ ), where the random components and are independent of each other.
Hence, the validity of as an indicator of ̇ depends on the relative magnitude of . Once is used as a substitute of unobserved ̇ ( = + + ), the relationship between and provides a lower bound of the validity of as an indicator of ̇.
Let denote a patent indicator of firm in year , which is assumed to depend on firm-specific variables in , the log of the R&D stock , industry fixed effects and year fixed effects in the following way:
(3) = 0 + + + + +
In this setting, a significant would reject the null hypothesis that is not a valid measure for economically valuable knowledge. The vector of characteristics includes the PCT stock scaled by employees to proxy the accumulated experience in international patenting, the log number of employees to control for firm size effects, the log of firm age, and a dummy to control for private ownership. Furthermore, we account for heterogeneity in the economic development across provinces by the log of provincial GDP per capita.
The literature often estimates models similar to equation (3), where either is a patent count (Pakes and Griliches 1984) , a citation-weighted patent count (Aghion et al. 2013 ), a normalized citation count (Hall et al. 2001) , or average citations per patent (Bessen 2008 , Blind et al. 2009 ). While the number of patents is associated with the magnitude of research effort, citation-weighted patent count combines the scale of effort with a measure of success (Jaffe and de Rassenfosse 2017). The measure of citation-weighted patent count is defined as patents multiplied by the raw number of citations received. The measure normalized citation count is a refinement of raw citation counts, as it uses citations that are normalized to eliminate technology and year differences. Studies with focus on China are up to now only available for as a simple patent count. They tend to find a patent-R&D elasticity that is considerably lower as compared to OECD countries (Chen and Zhang 2019 , Hu et al. 2017 , Hu and Jefferson 2009 .
In Table 4 we estimate equation (3) with the ISR indices as the dependent variable.
We use a Tobit model because there is censoring from below at zero as the latent variable citations is only observed when patents are above zero but remains unobserved otherwise. We start with the F index in column (1) and find that is positive and highly significant. We transform the coefficient of 0.166 into a marginal effect of 0.034 to derive an intuitive interpretation of the size of the effect. The Tobit model has the structure of a linear-log model,
i.e. the dependent variable is in linear form and the regressor of interest, the R&D stock, is in logarithms. Because an increase of the R&D stock by 1% corresponds to an increase in the log of the R&D stock by 0.01, we multiply the marginal effect of 0.034 by 0.01 to arrive at the unit change in the index that is caused by a 1% increase in the R&D stock. Thus, we find that a 1% increase in the R&D stock corresponds to an increase in the quality index by 0.00034, or by 0.034 percentage points. When interpreted relative to the mean of the F index (0.433 or 43.3%), a 1% increase in R&D stock leads to an increase in patent quality of about 0.1%. This result confirms a positive and economically important relationship between the R&D stock and patent quality.
Moving on to the interpretation of the control variables, we find a positive and highly significant impact for PCT intensity. Patent quality shows a positive relationship with a firm's experience in filing international patents. Note: Analysis is at the firm-year level. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
In column (2) the dependent variable is the FD index and becomes substantially smaller and insignificant. In column (3) with the FDS index as the dependent variable is close to zero and insignificant. With the addition of self citations to the index we find a positive and significant coefficient for firm size. This is to be expected as larger firms have more prior art they can cite. In columns (4) and (5) we restrict the index to D and S citations, respectively, and neither index has a significant relationship with R&D stock. For self citations we again confirm a positive and highly significant correlation with firm size. The main result is that only F citations, but not D or S citations, provide a valid measure of patent quality. 13
Robustness tests
In this section we challenge our main results in several robustness tests. First, in Table 5 we report results for a Heckman selection model that allows firms to select to be PCT applicants.
The model fits the two independent processes of filing patents and receiving citations. The 13 Our results for the validation of the different citation types do not hinge on the use of average patent quality as dependent variable. We also computed the outcome variable based on citation-weighted patent counts and normalized citation counts. The results remain very similar when we re-estimate the regressions presented in Table 4 based on the alternative dependent variables.
proper specification requires an exclusion restriction that explains selection but is no explanatory factor in the outcome equation. We use the number of employees relative to the industry mean as an exclusion restriction, following the rationale that relatively larger firms are more likely to file PCT applications, whereas relative firm size is no determinant for average patent quality. The positive and at the 1%-level significant coefficient of the exclusion restriction supports this rationale (column 1). 14 The outcome equations for patent quality show only a significant influence of the R&D stock for the F index (column 2) but not for the indices that include D and S citations (columns 3-6). Our main results are therefore confirmed by the selection model. The positive values of rho and the inverse mills ratio (IMR) confirm a positive correlation of the error terms in the selection and outcome equations. Under the assumption of a correctly specified model, the null hypothesis of no selection bias can be tested with a t-test on the IMR (Wooldridge 2010, p.806) . The insignificance of the IMR suggests that unobservable firm characteristics are unlikely to induce selection bias. Note: Analysis is at the firm-year level. includes the stock of PCT applications by thousand employees, the log of employees, the log of age, a dummy for private ownership, and the log of provincial GDP per capita. IRM is the inverse mills ratio. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
14 The selection equation also shows a positive and highly significant effect of the R&D stock on the probability of filing at least one PCT application. Filing PCT applications is also more likely for private-ownership and firms in provinces with a higher GDP per capita. Note that we omit the regressor PCT intensity in the first stage because of high correlation with the probability of having at least one PCT application.
We perform additional specification tests because several studies have shown that the result of Heckman models can be sensitive to misspecification (e.g. Lennox et al. 2012 and Certo et al. 2016) . First, we calculate the correlation of the IMR with the other regressors of the outcome equation. High multicollinearity implies that the IMR does not contain substantial information that is not already included in the other regressors. In such a situation, an insignificant IMR would not reliably indicate the absence of selection bias. With an average correlation of 0.295 we can reject this concern. This result together with the highly significant exclusion restriction in the selection equation suggests that the exclusion restriction is strong enough to detect selection bias if present. Second, we lag the exclusion restriction "relative size" by one period to test robustness with respect to changes in the restriction. The results for R&D stock in the outcome equations remain almost identical and the exclusion restriction remains significant at 1%. Third, we investigate whether the results of the outcome equation change when selection is not controlled for. If an insignificant IMR is the result of model misspecification, then results with and without selection correction can still diverge. For the Heckman selection model, we obtain a marginal effect for the R&D stock of 0.034 in column (2), which is in fact identical to the marginal effect in the Tobit model. Overall, we find that our results are not compromised by possible selection bias.
In a second robustness test, reported in Table 6, Note: Analysis is at the firm-year level. includes the stock of PCT applications by thousand employees, the log of employees, the log of age, a dummy for private ownership, and the log of provincial GDP per capita. Bootstrapped standard errors with 50 repetitions. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Third, we exclude the largest PCT applicant, ZTE, and re-estimate Table 4 . The significance levels remain unchanged and the marginal effect in column (1) is very similar (results not reported). Thus, we could confirm that the results are not dominated by a single PCT champion.
So far we have argued that the validity of D and S citations may suffer from a subsidyinduced inflation of low quality patents and citations in China. Therefore, in our final robustness test we aim to scrutinize the validity of indices in a context without subsidies.
While we cannot identify the before-and-after subsidy setting in China, we can turn to Germany as a country without patent subsidies. The German firm-level data comes from the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) and includes about 3000 firms. Table A3 shows the ISR indices based on PCT applications filed by the German firms between 2001 and 2009. While the averages between indices increase monotonically from the F to FD and FDS index, the averages within indices remain rather stable over time. Assuming that the FDS index is unbiased in the German setting, the results suggest that Germany's patent quality narrowly oscillates around the non-German comparison group.
We estimate equation (3) based on the German firm-level data. Because the relationship between R&D and patent quality may differ between industries, we weight the observations according to the Chinese industry composition to make results more comparable across countries. Table 7 replicates the main estimations reported in Table 4 . Parameter is positive and significant in all six columns. When we interpret the marginal effects relative to the mean of the indices, we find that a 1% increase in the R&D stock corresponds to an increase in patent quality of 0.1% for the F index, the same magnitude as for Chinese firms.
Thus, the F index, which is exogenous to economic policy, gives the same result in both countries. In a context without subsidies, we find that all three citation types are valid measures for patent quality. 
Discussion
China's increase in patent quantity is partially driven by application targets, patent subsidies, and other policy instruments. An important question is whether citations have been inflated by policy-induced, low quality patents or provide an adequate reflection of China's rising innovation capacity. Based on our analysis we fail to confirm that Chinese D and S citations are a valid measure for economically valuable knowledge. In contrast, non-Chinese F citations, which are independent from China's economic policy, provide a valid indicator. We replicate the analysis in a context without subsidies and the significance of all indices shows that, when policy distortion is not a concern, all citations types are valid measures. Our findings support the argument by Goodhart (1975) and Lucas (1976) More generally, in settings without policy distortion all three ISR indices can be used to maximize the information content provided by forward citations. Beyond the analysis of PCT patents, ISR citations may be used to measure the quality of national patents because prior art search for PCT applications is not restricted to previous PCT applications, but rather it encompasses the patent literature from a large number of patent offices. The indices are versatile in their application as they can be used to analyze patent quality at various levels, e.g. at the country, industry, or firm level.
In future research it would be of interest to investigate for Chinese firms whether the quality of patent applications is related to measures of firm performance, such as total factor productivity or profitability.
Conclusion
In recent years China's patent applications have risen faster than R&D expenditures, resulting in decreasing R&D inputs per patent. Given that this patent expansion is policy-driven, we validate domestic citations in comparison to foreign ones, which are invariant to China's policy, as economic indicators. We derive internationally comparable citation data from ISRs and use foreign, domestic, and self citations to perform a comprehensive analysis of patent quality.
Whereas foreign citations show that Chinese PCT patent applications reach only a third of the non-Chinese quality benchmark, the extension towards domestic and self citations suggests an increasing quality level that is closer to the international benchmark. The rising focus on domestic prior art corresponds to a decoupling from the international innovation system, while the rise in self citations emphasized a focus on prior art from within the organization. However, the differences among indices can also be the result of a policy-driven citation inflation. We investigate these differences based on firm-level regressions and find that only foreign citations, but not domestic and self citations, are a valid indicator of patent quality. Using Germany as a representative country without patent subsidies, we show that all three citations types may be used as an economic indicator if policy distortion is not a concern. Our results emphasize that Chinese citations suffer from an upward bias and should be employed with caution if they are to be interpreted as a measure of patent quality. 
